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Abstract
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to
deviations which could be \unambiguously" interpreted as coming
from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types
are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-
ceiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes
a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in mono-
tonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of
deviation. Our result therefore provides a plausible story behind the
selection made by Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 criterion on this class of
games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982)
model with costly signaling, where standard re¯nements have no ef-
fect. We show that only a Riley-like separating equilibrium is immune
to these deviations.
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11 Introduction
In Sender-Receiver games, out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be thought of as
the Sender's hypothesis of what the Receiver would think upon observing
a deviation. This hypothesis rationalizes the Sender's anticipation of what
the Receiver would do, in turn justifying the Sender's decision not to deviate
from the equilibrium. Even though out-of-equilibrium beliefs should not
be taken too literally, equilibrium re¯nements often prescribe exactly what
those beliefs should be, instead of stopping at conditions that rationalize the
Sender's actions.
In this paper we show that strong predictions neither require, nor neces-
sarily follow from, such speci¯c impositions on beliefs. Rather than re¯ning
the set of admissible beliefs, we ask whether it is possible for the Sender to
implicitly signal a candidate set of deviating types, even if he cannot antici-
pate exactly which beliefs the Receiver would form over that set. A Credible
Deviation is one that uniquely and unambiguously identi¯es a set of types
that gain from deviating, provided that the Sender anticipates the Receiver
to form some beliefs over that set. We analyze the extent to which equilibria
are immune to such deviations in costly-signaling games.
Our results concern two classes of signaling games. In Section 3 we show
that in monotonic signaling games, only the least-distortive separating (or
Riley) equilibrium outcome is immune to the Credible Deviations we describe.
Therefore, on this particular class of games, there is a connection between the
predictions made by standard re¯nements (D1, stability) and immunity to
Credible Deviations. That is, our concept provides one behavioral motivation
for selecting the stable outcome on this class.
Section 4 considers a class of signaling games whose structure is like Craw-
ford and Sobel's (1982), but with costly messages. Similar to the previous
model, only a \Riley-like" equilibrium is free of Credible Deviations. In con-
trast, standard re¯nements widely used in practice (e.g. D1, D2, Divinity,
etc.) can have little predictive power here.
21.1 An example
Consider the Sender-Receiver game in Figure 1. The Sender privately knows
whether he is a \Quantitative" type or not; both types are equally likely
from the Receiver's (prior) perspective. The Sender must choose an action:
whether or not to get an MBA.
If the Sender gets an MBA, the employer (Receiver) sees this message
and decides whether to promote the Sender to Head of Human Resources
(HR), to promote him to Chief Financial O±cer (CFO), or to keep him at
his current job (Assistant) with a pay raise. If the Sender does not get an
MBA, the game ends.
Assist. HR CFO Assist.
Quantitative 2, 2 0, 0 5, 5 3, 3
Non-Quant. 2, 2 1, 5 0, 0 3, 3
no MBA get MBA
Figure 1: A Sender-Receiver game. The Sender's payo® is listed ¯rst.
The Receiver would like to promote an MBA in a way corresponding to his
type. Neither type wants to be promoted to HR, while only a Quantitative
type would like to be CFO. It pro¯ts both Sender types (and the Receiver)
to get an MBA and a raise with no promotion.
There are three kinds of (pure strategy) equilibria in this game.1 In one,
both Sender types get an MBA, and due to the balanced prior beliefs, the
Receiver keeps the employee as an Assistant. In another, only the Quantita-
tive type gets an MBA, which leads to promotion to CFO. In the third, no
Sender type gets an MBA. This outcome is supported by the Sender's an-
ticipation that the Receiver would promote an MBA to HR with su±ciently
high probability. In turn, this means the Sender thinks the Receiver will
believe that only (or with high probability) non-Quantitative types get an
MBA.
We now argue that the latter kind of equilibrium is not robust to the pos-
sibility that an out-of-equilibrium message can be interpreted as an implicit
1We consider only pure strategies throughout the paper. In any case, we make assump-
tions in both Sections 3 and 4 that imply pure best responses for the Receiver.
3statement about the Sender's possible type(s). Before doing so it is worth
noting that, perhaps surprisingly, all three equilibria satisfy various re¯ne-
ments commonly used in the literature, such as the Intuitive Criterion, D1,
and even Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) stability. Proofs of this are available
upon request.
Suppose that the \no MBA" pooling equilibrium is being anticipated by
the Receiver, and consider the possibility that if the Receiver sees the out-
of-equilibrium choice \get MBA," he interprets it as the following (implicit)
statement: \I am the Quantitative type." Would this be credible?
If the Receiver were to believe this (implicit) statement, he would choose
the CFO action. Therefore the Quantitative type would gain from the Re-
ceiver's trust in this statement. The non-Quantitative type however would
not. In this sense, this implicit statement is credible: the Quantitative type
is precisely the only one who would want to \send" it.2
On the other hand, \get MBA" cannot credibly convey the statement
\I am the non-Quantitative type." The Receiver's trust in this statement
would cause him to choose HR, under which the non-Quantitative type does
not gain. In fact neither type would gain if the Receiver believed such a
statement.
Finally, consider the possibility that if the Sender gets an MBA, he is
trying to convey the less precise statement: \I am either the Quantitative
type or the non-Quantitative type." In order to determine whether or not this
is a credible statement, we need to predict how the Receiver would respond
to it. More precisely, we need to determine what the Sender anticipates
the Receiver to believe about the likelihood of types in order to predict a
response.
One could argue that, due to the credibility of the \I am Quantitative"
speech, it should be less likely for a Quantitative type to send this less precise
message.3 On the other hand, one could admit the possibility that the two
2This kind of reasoning also appears in Grossman and Perry's (1986) Perfect Sequential
Equilibrium and in Farrell's (1993) neologism-proofness. In fact those concepts would con-
sider the credibility of \I am the Quantitative type" su±cient to rule out this equilibrium.
Below we diverge from these two concepts; see also Section 2.2.
3Precisely this kind of argument leads Matthews et al. (1991) to require a consistent
set of \speeches" which may separate di®erent deviant types from each other.
4types have di®erent abilities to perform forward induction reasoning (which
have not been explicitly modeled here). For example, the Quantitative type
could be more likely to be able to perform this reasoning, which would make
this type more likely to have sent the message. A third, more stringent
approach would be to explicitly assume that the Receiver simply updates his
prior using Bayes' rule when evaluating such a potential implied statement.
Since receiving this out-of-equilibrium message is a counterfactual event,
we see little justi¯cation for prescribing any single, particular belief over
the two types when evaluating this speech. In fact, we view the Sender's
anticipation of the Receiver's posterior beliefs as being ambiguous. Therefore
as a ¯rst approach, we use a max-min criterion to evaluate preferences when
Sender types are deciding whether to deviate. This means that, in this
example, we ask whether both types would gain from conveying this less
precise message, regardless of the beliefs formed by the Receiver.
If the Receiver puts enough weight on the probability that the Quantita-
tive type is trying to make this speech, the Receiver would choose CFO.
As argued above, the non-Quantitative type would not gain in this sce-
nario. Similarly, with beliefs su±ciently biased toward the non-Quantitative
type, the Receiver would choose HR, making both types regret the deviation.
Therefore neither type would unambiguously gain from conveying this third
statement, undermining its credibility.4
To summarize, if we interpret the message \get MBA" as an implicit
attempt to convey information about a candidate set of types, only one such
message is credible: \I am the Quantitative type." The uniqueness of this
credible message makes this equilibrium vulnerable to a deviation which can
be \unambiguously" interpreted to be coming from a unique set of possible
Sender-types, namely the singleton \Quantitative type."
In more general games, we say that an equilibrium is vulnerable to a
credible deviation if there is an out-of-equilibrium message m through which
the Sender can convey the following statement. (This \speech" is not really
4In contrast, Grossman and Perry (loc. cit.) would consider this statement credible
because they require the Receiver to update his prior o® the equilibrium path. This is the
crucial di®erence between our concept and theirs. In a modi¯ed version of the example
(available upon request), they would eliminate all pure equilibria while we would not. The
same can occur in monotonic signaling games as well (Section 3).
5made by the Sender; it is implicitly communicated through m.)
\By sending this out-of-equilibrium message m, I am signaling that my
type belongs to the set of types C. If you form any belief over C and
take a corresponding best response, then any type µ 2 C is guaranteed
to be better o® than he would have been in equilibrium. Conversely,
for any remaining type µ0 = 2 C, there exists a belief over C (and your
corresponding best response) that would make µ0 worse o® than in
equilibrium. That is, C is precisely the set of types that gains re-
gardless of the beliefs you form, as long as those beliefs are over C.
Moreover, given message m, this speech cannot be made for any other
set C0."
The existence of such a message m and set of types C makes the equilib-
rium in question less plausible than others. Under a mild notion of forward
induction, it becomes a self-ful¯lling prophecy for the Receiver, upon see-
ing m, to behave as if the Sender's type is in C.
In this argument, we do not prescribe speci¯c posterior beliefs for the
Receiver following the receipt of m. As discussed following the example
of Figure 1, this even allows for the possibility that the Sender's type is
correlated with the ability to perform this forward-induction reasoning. If
the Receiver admits the possibility of such correlation, it is unclear how he
would update his beliefs without specifying a more detailed model. It is even
less clear how the Sender should anticipate the Receiver's understanding of
this possibility. Since we think of the Receiver's posterior beliefs simply as
a way to rationalize the Sender's equilibrium behavior, a theory with fewer
speci¯c assumptions on these posterior beliefs is more appealing.
The ideas outlined above may appear similar to certain concepts used in
the literature on equilibrium re¯nements. We postpone comparisons to this
literature to Section 2.2, after we formalize our de¯nitions.
2 Sender-Receiver Games
Our main results concern two di®erent classes of 2-player, Sender-Receiver
games with costly signaling. Since those two classes share some structure,
we introduce their shared notation here.
6The Sender has private information that is summarized by his type
µ 2 £ = fµ1;µ2;:::;µng ½ R. For notational convenience, we order the types
so that µ1 < µ2 < ¢¢¢ < µn. The commonly known prior probability that
the Sender's type is µ is ¼(µ). Upon realizing his type, the Sender chooses
a message m 2 R+. A strategy for the Sender is a function M : £ ! R+.
After observing any message m, the Receiver chooses an action a 2 R. A
strategy for the Receiver is a function A: R+ ! R. The Sender and Receiver
receive respective payo®s of uS(µ;m;a) and uR(µ;m;a), which are both con-
tinuously di®erentiable in (m;a). A Sender-Receiver game is given by the
tuple (£;¼;uS;uR).
The Receiver's (posterior) beliefs upon receiving the Sender's message
is a function ¹: R+ ! 4(£), where 4(£) refers to the set of probability
distributions on £. For any message m 2 R+ and any ¯xed (posterior belief)
distribution ~ ¼ 2 4(£), denote the Receiver's best responses to m (given
~ ¼) by BR(~ ¼;m) ´ argmaxa2R E[uR(µ;m;a)j ~ ¼]. Assumptions made below
guarantee the non-emptiness of this correspondence. In a standard abuse of
notation, for any set of types T µ £ we write BR(T;m) ´
S
~ ¼2¢T BR(~ ¼;m),
which can be thought of as the Receiver's rationalizable actions knowing only
that µ 2 T.
The triplet (M;A;¹) is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it satis¯es the
usual incentive compatibility and consistency conditions.5 This concept puts
no restrictions on beliefs following out-of-equilibrium messages.
When an equilibrium (M;A;¹) is clearly given in context, we denote
the Sender's equilibrium payo® (as a function of his type) as u¤
S(µ) ´
uS(µ;M(µ);A(M(µ))).
2.1 Formalizing Credible Deviations
We ask whether the Sender, upon sending an out-of-equilibrium message m,
can induce the Receiver to reason that it must have been sent by a type
within some set C. Under our de¯nition, this reasoning is justi¯ed when C
is precisely the set of Sender types that would bene¯t from deviating to m,
whenever the Receiver plays any best response to m with beliefs restricted
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a), De¯nition 8.1, pp. 325-326. On the classes of games
we consider, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is equivalent to Sequential Equilibrium.
7to C. An equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation if, for some
out-of-equilibrium message, there is a unique such C.
Definition 1 (Vulnerability to a Credible Deviation) Given an
equilibrium (M;A;¹), we say that an out-of-equilibrium message m 2
R+nM(£) is a Credible Deviation if the following condition holds for ex-
actly one (non-empty) set of types C µ £.





We call C the (unique) Credible Deviators' Club for message m. If such a
message exists, the equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation.
The fact that (1) is an equality (as opposed to, say, the inclusion relation
C ¶) enforces the precision mentioned above. The uniqueness requirement
on C given m makes our invulnerability condition weaker. If two such sets,
C and C0, existed for m then it would be arbitrary for types in C to assume
that the Receiver would restrict beliefs to C, and not to C0 (or even C [C0).
However, all of our results would hold even if C is not required to be unique.
We use a max-min criterion to evaluate the Sender's preferences because
it is unclear how the Receiver should form beliefs over C (see Section 1.1).
We view this as a natural starting point, though alternate de¯nitions could be
considered. For example, one could require only that the Receiver possess a
single, \worst-case" belief over C that dissuades each µ = 2 C from deviating.6
It turns out that this weaker condition would yield the same results as our
de¯nition for the models in Sections 3 and 4. On the other hand, games exist
in which this alternate version has no bite and ours does.
2.2 Relation to the refinements literature
Immunity to Credible Deviations may appear similar to certain equilibrium
re¯nements used in the literature, but there is no general, logical relation
between these concepts and our condition. We explore this below.
6We thank Johannes HÄ orner and Jeroen Swinkels for independent comments leading
us to these observations.
8Perhaps the least controversial re¯nement is the Intuitive Criterion (see
Cho and Kreps (1987)). It deems an equilibrium implausible whenever some
Sender type would gain from deviating to an out-of-equilibrium message, as
long as the Receiver makes the minimal assumption that it was sent by types
that could potentially bene¯t.
Definition 2 (Intuitive Criterion) For a given equilibrium (M;A;¹)
and out-of-equilibrium message m 2 R+ n M(£), denote by J(m) the set of
types whose equilibrium payo® is higher than any payo® they could get by
sending m, as long as the Receiver plays a rationalizable action, i.e.





The equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion (via m) if J(m) 6= £ and




uS(µ;m;a)g 6= ;: (2)
Inequality (2) says that by sending m, at least one type µ gains unambigu-
ously so long as the Receiver restricts his beliefs to £nJ(m). This restriction
on the Receiver's beliefs is a very minimal requirement, since no type in J(m)
could gain by sending m if he anticipates any rational reaction from the Re-
ceiver. Given this restriction, the Intuitive Criterion merely checks for the
existence of some type µ = 2 J(m) who, anticipating such beliefs, would gain
unambiguously compared to his equilibrium payo®.
This concept di®ers from Vulnerability to Credible Deviations in two
ways. First note that in eqn. (1) the Receiver's beliefs are restricted more
than in eqn. (2). This makes it easier to ¯nd deviating types in (1) than in (2),
making the Intuitive Criterion a relatively weak concept. Second, however,
consider which types should not have an incentive to deviate. While eqn. (2)
merely requires non-emptiness of the set of deviators, eqn. (1) precludes types
outside C from wanting to perform certain deviations. This makes it harder
to ¯nd a deviating set (club) in (1) than in (2), making the Intuitive Criterion
a relatively stronger concept.
On the classes of games studied in this paper (or any Sender-Receiver
game with only two Sender types), the Intuitive Criterion is weaker than
9Immunity to Credible Deviations. There are, however, games in which the
Intuitive Criterion rules out an equilibrium which is immune to Credible
Deviations.7
In certain important classes of Sender-Receiver games with more than two
Sender types (e.g. Spence (1973)), the Intuitive Criterion does not reduce
the set of equilibrium outcomes. This has led to, among others, a well-
known concept that makes speci¯c requirements on posterior beliefs. The
D1 Criterion (see Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), Cho and
Sobel (1990)) requires the Receiver to disbelieve that a deviating message
could be sent by a type µ who weakly gains \less often" (i.e. under fewer
a 2 BR(£;m)) than some other type µ0 strictly gains.
Definition 3 (D1 Criterion) An equilibrium (M;A;¹) fails the D1 Cri-
terion if there exists an out-of-equilibrium message m 2 R+nM(£) and types
µ;µ0 2 £ such that ¹(µjm) > 0 and
fa 2 BR(£;m) : u
¤
S(µ) · uS(µ;m;a)g





As has been observed in the literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a),
p. 460), there is little intuitive justi¯cation for the Receiver to put in¯nitely
more weight on Sender types that gain from the deviation \more often" (µ0)
than others (µ). While there are arguments against the \speeches approach"
as well (e.g. the Stiglitz Critique), one could argue that a missing behavioral
motivation is a disadvantage of this practically useful re¯nement.
This motivates our study of monotonic signaling games (Section 3). We
show that D1 eliminates an equilibrium if and only if it is Vulnerable to Cred-
ible Deviations. Hence the Riley outcome can be justi¯ed by an intuitive,
plausible robustness check: Immunity to Credible Deviations. While we re-
ject the same equilibrium outcomes that D1 eliminates, we do not impose
any speci¯c restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. On the other hand, D1
has little predictive power in a class of non-monotonic signaling games we
study (Section 4), while our condition still selects a unique outcome.
7Straightforward proofs of these facts are available upon request.
10A related notion is that of Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) Stability. In
generic Sender-Receiver games all Stable equilibria satisfy the D1 Criterion;
furthermore the two concepts are equivalent on the class of discrete mono-
tonic signaling games, resembling the continuous one we study in Section 3
(see Cho and Sobel (1990)). In contrast, on the general class of Sender-
Receiver games, the Stability of an equilibrium neither implies nor is implied
by its immunity to Credible Deviations.8
Our motivation for Credible Deviations has a °avor similar to the moti-
vation behind Grossman and Perry's (1986) Perfect Sequential Equilibrium
(PSE). Roughly speaking, under PSE a set of types T breaks an equilibrium
with an out-of-equilibrium message m if all types in T improve their payo®
by sending that message as long as the Receiver believes that all (and only)
the types in T would always deviate and send m. The word always here
implies that the Receiver is speci¯cally assumed to update his priors over T
in accordance with Bayes' Rule. This amounts to replacing BR(C;m) with
BR(¼jC;m) in the right-hand side of eqn. (1).9
In Section 1.1, we argued against doing this. When considering the case
C0 = fQuant;Non-Quantg in that example, PSE would specify that the
Receiver use precisely his prior beliefs, which in turn would cause him to
choose the action \Assist." Since both types prefer this outcome, this set
of types C0 would break the pooling equilibrium under PSE. However, C =
fQuantg would also break the equilibrium under PSE by inducing the action
\CFO". Therefore, when beliefs over C0 are required to coincide with the
prior distribution, the Receiver is implicitly forced to ignore the possibility
that C is the deviating set. We ¯nd this inconsistent.
More generally, our opinion is that such speci¯c assumptions o® the equi-
librium path are too prescriptive. While we can think of equilibrium play
(and the resulting beliefs) as being self-enforced by, say, repeated interaction,
pre-play communication, or even explicit agreement, there is less justi¯cation
8A less related notion is evolutionary stability in games with pre-play communication,
see Kim and Sobel (1995) and references therein.
9To be precise, Grossman and Perry allow the Receiver to put less weight on types
in T who are indi®erent about deviating, re°ecting the idea that such types may randomly
choose whether to deviate. Therefore the posterior beliefs may not be exactly ¼jT. PSE
also does not require uniqueness of the deviating set of types T, as we do.
11for this reasoning o® the equilibrium path.
Even on the standard class of monotonic signaling games, Perfect Sequen-
tial Equilibria may not exist; see Sec. 10.6 of vanDamme (1991). We examine
that same class in Section 3, and characterize a single equilibrium outcome
as being immune to Credible Deviations. It is worth noting, however, that if
an equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation by a singleton C, then
it also fails PSE, since only one belief can be formed over a singleton set.
Relatedly, Farrell's (1993) Neologism-proofness asks whether a set of
types can credibly distinguish itself in cheap-talk games by explicitly sending
an out-of-equilibrium message that self-identi¯es a set of potential deviating
types, T. An equilibrium fails Neologism-proofness if the types in T are pre-
cisely the ones who gain when, in response to the message, the Receiver's
beliefs are a Bayesian update of his prior beliefs on T. This concept is anal-
ogous to PSE, so the above comparisons apply.
3 Monotonic Signaling Games
Monotonic signaling games (Spence (1973)) capture situations in which: the
Sender would prefer the Receiver to take higher actions; the Receiver prefers
his action to be correlated with the Sender's type; and it is relatively less
costly for higher Sender types to send higher messages. These games exhibit
multiple equilibria. In applications, re¯nements such as D1 or Stability are
used to select a unique outcome, the least-distortive separating (or Riley)
outcome.10 In this section we show that this outcome is the only one immune
to Credible Deviations.
Following Cho and Sobel (1990) and Ramey (1996), monotonic signaling
games are de¯ned as follows. First, uS(µ;m;a) is strictly increasing in a for
all (µ;m). One can think of a as some sort of compensation for the Sender;
all Sender types always prefer more. In order to avoid solutions involving
arbitrarily large messages and actions we assume that limm!1 uS(µ;m;a) =
¡1 for all µ and a.
We assume that uR is such that, for any type µ and message m, the
10Note that Grossman and Perry's (1986) PSE does not always exist on this class
(vanDamme (1991)).
12Receiver has a unique best response, i.e. that BR(fµg;m) is a singleton.
Throughout Section 3 we denote this action as f¯(µ;m)g ´ BR(fµg;m).
Furthermore we assume that ¯(¢;¢) is uniformly bounded from above.
We assume that @uR=@a is strictly increasing in µ for all (m;a). As
a result, BR(~ ¼;m) is greater for beliefs that are greater in the ¯rst-order
stochastic sense, and in particular, ¯(µ;m) is strictly increasing in µ (Cho
and Sobel (1990), p. 392). Together with monotonicity, this captures the
idea that the Sender wants to induce the Receiver to choose larger actions
by trying to convince him that his type is greater.
We make a central assumption in Spencian signaling games, the single-
crossing condition: ¡(@uS=@m)=(@uS=@a) is strictly decreasing in µ. That
is, for a given increase in m, in order to keep the Sender at the same utility
level, a higher Sender-type needs less compensation in terms of a (in case m
is locally costly for the Sender) or he is willing to give up a larger amount of
a (in case m is locally bene¯cial for him).
Finally, we assume that uS(µ;m;¯(µ;m)) is strictly quasiconcave in m.
In many applications, this assumption is implied by stronger assumptions
made directly on the primitives of the model.
Most applied signaling models have a lot more structure. For example,
since m is usually interpreted as a costly action undertaken by the Sender
that may be bene¯cial for the Receiver (e.g. the Sender's education level), it
is often assumed that uS(µ;m;a) is weakly decreasing in m and ¯(µ;m) is
weakly increasing in m. We need not impose these conditions.
An additional piece of notation simpli¯es the exposition. For any µ and
m, let ^ a(µ;m) be the action to satisfy
uS(µ;m;^ a(µ;m)) = u
¤
S(µ) (3)
if such an action exists, and denote ^ a(µ;m) = 1 otherwise. This action by
the Receiver would give Sender-type µ his equilibrium payo® after sending m.
If such an action exists, it is unique by monotonicity.
The single-crossing property suggests that higher types need less compen-
sation for sending higher messages than do lower types. Lemma 1 strengthens
that idea, applying it relative to equilibrium payo®s. Proofs of all Lemmas
13appear in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Fix an equilibrium (M;A;¹) and type µh 2 R+. For all m0 >
M(µh) and all µ` < µh, ^ a(µh;m0) < 1 implies ^ a(µh;m0) < ^ a(µ`;m0).
The next lemma states that in this monotonic environment, when search-
ing for a potential deviators' club, it su±ces to ¯nd a type µ0 who would
prefer to be self-identi¯ed by an o®-equilibrium message, while no lower type
would prefer to be perceived as µ0.
Lemma 2 Fix an equilibrium (M;A;¹), and suppose there exists a type µ0














0)) 8µ < µ
0:
Then there exists a unique credible deviators' club for m0.
The explanation for this result has two parts. First, in the monotonic
setting, the Sender is made worse o® as the Receivers beliefs shift towards
lower types. Therefore, the \worst" belief over any club C is the one putting
probability one on the lowest type in C. If C satis¯es (1), then the inequalities
of the lemma must be satis¯ed for µ0 = minC. Furthermore these inequalities
are su±cient since adding higher types to a set C does not change the set
BR(minC;m). This explains why the inequalities generate some credible
deviators' club.
The uniqueness result also relies on monotonicity. Since lower types can-
not gain by sending m0 when being perceived as µ0, they also cannot gain
by being perceived as themselves, and hence cannot belong to any club C.
If only higher types formed a club C by sending m0, µ0 would want to join
this club; hence µ0 must belong to any club that exists, and be the minimum
member. But then all types in C0 would want to join such a club, since µ0 is
the \worst case" member.
This result rules out pooling (or semi-pooling). The intuition for the
following lemma is that the highest type µ0 in any pooling set would be able
14to ¯nd a su±ciently high message m0 with which to satisfy the inequalities
of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If an equilibrium (M;A;¹) is not Vulnerable to Credible Devia-
tions, it is a separating equilibrium|no two types send the same message.
Finally, of all the separating equilibria, only the least-distortive one is
not Vulnerable. In a separating equilibrium, each type µi 2 £ is uniquely
identi¯ed by his equilibrium message mi. As a result, ¹(µi jmi) = 1 and the



















j)) ¸ uS(µj;m;¯(µi;m)) 8j < i;
and ar
i = ¯(µi;mr
i) for each i. The uniqueness of such messages is guaranteed
by our quasi-concavity assumption. Due to the single-crossing assumption,
the Riley messages mr
i also are increasing in i. This is obvious when messages
are always costly, but it also holds on our more-general class of games.
Lemma 4 Any equilibrium whose outcome is di®erent from the Riley out-
come is Vulnerable to Credible Deviations.
The intuition for this result is that, if a separating equilibrium has a \gap"
between equilibrium messages beyond that of the Riley outcome, then some
type would be able to lower his message and still maintain the inequalities
of Lemma 2. It immediately yields our main result.
Theorem 1 The Riley outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome that is
not Vulnerable to Credible Deviations.
Proof: Lemma 4 makes any other outcome Vulnerable. To prove that the
Riley outcome is not Vulnerable, observe from Cho and Sobel (1990) that
15the Riley outcome can be supported by a sequential equilibrium (in fact,
with out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy D1). Fix such an equilibrium,
and suppose toward contradiction that C is a deviators' club for some out-
of-equilibrium message m0, i.e. eqn. ((1)) holds for m = m0. Denote the
lowest type in C as µi = minC. As in the proof of Lemma 2, due to the
monotonicity of the Receiver's best responses with respect to beliefs, and the
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i)) > uS(µi;m0;¯(µi;m0)). That is, µi
prefers not to deviate from mr
i to m0 when the Receiver believes the message
came from him, which contradicts µi 2 C. ¤
Theorem 1 shows that on this class of games, Credible Deviations exist if
and only if D1 fails. As we show in the next section, however, this similarity
breaks down even on a similar class of games, when we slightly weaken the
monotonic structure.
4 Information Transmission and Bias
In this section we consider a class of games which conveys the following type
of interaction. The Sender wants the Receiver to take an action that matches
his type; messages are costly; and the Receiver wants to take an action that
matches the Sender's type o®set by some bias. This is a version of Crawford
and Sobel's (1982) model, but with discrete types and costly signaling.11
We make the following assumptions. The Sender's payo® is of the form
uS(µ;m;a) = ¡d(µ ¡ a) ¡ c(µ;m). The distance function d is convex and
11It is somewhat similar to the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), who combine
costly signaling with Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk.
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Figure 2: If the Receiver's bias is large enough, a low type prefers being
perceived as a higher type to being perceived as himself.
symmetric about zero (d(x) ´ d(jxj)); hence increasing on [0;1). The cost
function c is continuous, strictly increasing in m, satis¯es limm!1 c(¢;m) =
1, and satis¯es single-crossing: c(µ;m0) ¡ c(µ;m) > c(µ0;m0) ¡ c(µ0;m) for
all m0 > m, µ0 > µ. In words, the Sender wants the Receiver to choose a as
close as possible to µ (with a symmetric convex loss function), while sending
larger messages is more costly for him, but relatively less costly if he has a
higher type.
The Receiver's payo® is of the form uR(µ;m;a) = ¡(µ¡a¡b)2, where b >
0 is a commonly known bias. As a consequence, in equilibrium the Receiver
chooses action a = E[µj¹;m] ¡ b, where E[µj¹;m] is the Sender's expected
type given the observed message m and Receiver's update function ¹. The
two parties' preferences are misaligned according to the bias b.
We shall analyze the case in which the bias is not \too small". In order to
impose this restriction without making assumptions on the prior distribution
of types, we assume that the bias is not small relative to the distance between
any two types.
Assumption: The bias is not too small: b > (µn ¡ µ1)=2.
To get intuition for the role of the bias assumption in our results, see
Figure 2. In this model, the no-small-bias assumption|coupled with the
fact that b > 0|implies that a low type prefers to be perceived as any higher
type. For instance, µ1 prefers the action a = µn ¡ b to the action a = µ1 ¡ b,
due to the symmetry of the distance function. In the monotonic games of
Section 3, this feature of low types wanting to be perceived as high types is
more general in that the Sender always prefers any higher action to a lower
one. Therefore our bias assumption in this section preserves some of this
incentive in a slightly richer model.
We now show that in this class of games there exists a unique outcome im-
17mune to Credible Deviations, while the D1 criterion does not always restrict
the set of equilibria.
4.1 Credible Equilibrium
The only equilibrium outcome immune to Credible Deviations involves sep-
aration. It is the unique outcome that minimizes the Sender's messages
subject to the incentive constraints: µ1 sends m1 = 0, µ2 sends a di®erent
message m2 low enough to make µ1 indi®erent between sending m1 = 0 and
deviating to m2, and so on. In this sense, this outcome resembles the Riley
outcome in Section 3.
To formalize this, observe that in any separating equilibrium (M;A;¹),
the Receivers equilibrium actions clearly satisfy A(M(µi)) ´ µi ¡ b. We
de¯ne a minimal-cost separating equilibrium to be one where A satis¯es that
condition, and additionally, M(µ1) = 0 while for 2 · i · n,
¡d(µi¡1¡A(M(µi¡1)))¡c(µi¡1;M(µi¡1)) = ¡d(µi¡1¡A(M(µi)))¡c(µi¡1;M(µi))
(6)
which states that µi¡1 is indi®erent between sending his equilibrium message
M(µi¡1) and sending M(µi). Because of the assumption that the bias is not
too small, these messages are uniquely de¯ned and strictly monotonic.
To prove that this is the unique surviving equilibrium, we show that in
any other equilibrium, a credible deviators' club must exist in one of two
ways. First, there could exist a separating type who is greater than any
pooling types (if they exist), but for whom eqn. (6) fails to hold. In the
proof of Lemma 5 we show that if any such types exist, the highest of them
would form a unique deviators' club.
Lemma 5 Suppose an equilibrium (M;A;¹) is immune to Credible Devia-
tions. If for some s ¸ 2, the types µs, µs+1,..., µn are all separating (i.e.
send unique equilibrium messages), then eqn. (6) holds for all i ¸ s.
Second, there could exist pooling types. Using the previous case's result,
we show (Lemma 6) that the highest one then would form a unique deviators'
club. Hence we arrive at Theorem 2: There can be no pooling, and the
separating equilibrium must be the one de¯ned above.
18Lemma 6 Suppose a non-separating equilibrium exists, and let µp denote the
highest pooling type. If eqn. (6) holds for all i > p, then there exists a message
for which fµpg is a unique credible deviators' club.
Alternating applications of Lemmas 5 and 6 prove the main result.
Theorem 2 If an equilibrium (M;A;¹) is immune to Credible Deviations
then it is a minimal-cost separating equilibrium: A(M(µi)) ´ µi¡b, M(µ1) =
0, and for 2 · i · n, M(µi) satis¯es (6).
Proof: If an equilibrium is immune to Credible Deviations, then Lemma 6
implies that the highest type, µn, does not pool. Hence Lemma 5 implies
that eqn. (6) holds for i = n.
In turn, this means (again with Lemma 6) that µn¡1 does not pool; hence
Lemma 5 implies that eqn. (6) also holds for i = n ¡ 1. Continuing this
argument for i = n ¡ 2;n ¡ 3;:::;2, µi does not pool and eqn. (6) holds.
Therefore µ1 also does not pool. It remains to be shown that M(µ1) = 0.
This is true in any separating equilibrium, though, under our assumption µn¡
µ1 < 2b. Indeed, the Receiver's equilibrium response A(M(µ1)) = µ1¡b is the
worst rationalizable action the Receiver could take (from µ1's perspective),
regardless of beliefs. Given this, M(µ1) = 0 is strictly best for µ1. ¤
4.2 D1 and Pooling
In order to see that the D1 Criterion may fail to select a unique outcome
in the class of games examined in this section, consider a 2-type example
where µ1 = 2, µ2 = 5, b = 2, and the prior is ¼(µ2) = 0:9. These parameters
satisfy our previous bias-assumption, namely µ2 ¡ µ1 < 2b. Let d(x) = jxj
and c(µi;m) = m=i.
There exists a pooling-equilibrium (M;A;¹) such that M(µ) ´ 0 and,
accordingly, A(0) = E(µ) ¡ b = 4:7 ¡ 2 = 2:7. We show that if A(m) =
µ1 ¡b = 0 and ¹(µ1 jm) = 1 for all m > 0, then the equilibrium satis¯es D1.
To see this, we examine the potential gains from deviation for both types.
Observe that regardless of the Receiver's (posterior) beliefs, he would never
choose an action outside the range [µ1 ¡ b;µ2 ¡ b] = [0;3]; hence we can
restrict attention to that interval.
190 1 2 3 4 5
µ1 µ2
E(µ) = 4:7
µ1 ¡ b µ2 ¡ b
A(0) = 2:7
Figure 3: Rationalizable actions preferred by µ1 (dashed line) are disjoint
from those preferred by µ2 (solid line), so D1 permits pooling.
If µ1 sends an out-of-equilibrium message m > 0 and the Receiver re-
sponds with a 2 [0;3], then µ1 gains (relative to his equilibrium payo®) if
and only if m 2 (0;:7) and a 2 (1:3 + m;2:7 ¡ m). This range of actions is
represented by the dashed line in Figure 3. Similarly, µ2 gains if and only if
m 2 (0;0:6) and a 2 (2:7 + m=2;3].12
For m 2 (0;0:6), both types could gain from deviation. In those cases,
however, (1:3+m;2:7¡m)\(2:7+m=2;3] = ;, i.e. the sets of actions which
make the two types better-o® are not related by inclusion (and in fact do not
even overlap). Hence D1 does not restrict out-of-equilibrium beliefs following
such a message.
For m 2 [0:6;0:7), only µ1 could gain from deviation; D1 therefore requires
¹(µ1jm) = 1. For m ¸ 0:7, neither type can gain from deviation and D1
places no restrictions ¹().
Therefore the pooling equilibrium satis¯es the D1 Criterion. Since the
Receiver responds with action A(m) = µ1 ¡ b = 0 for m > 0, neither type
could gain by deviating. On the other hand, this equilibrium is Vulnerable
to Credible Deviations since C = fµ2g is a unique credible deviators' club
for various out-of-equilibrium messages.
It is clear that this example is robust to perturbations. More extreme
priors would yield the same results, making the out-of-equilibrium beliefs we
used (with unit probability on the low type) even less appealing while still
satisfying D1. Furthermore, due to the slack in our arguments, it is clear
that there even exist D1 equilibria in which all types pool by sending some
positive message m > 0.
12Type µ2 could also gain for some values a > 3, but we have stated such an action is
never a best response for the Receiver.
205 Conclusion
We have shown that some equilibria of Sender-Receiver games are vulnerable
to a particular kind of signaling. Credible signals identify a set of deviating
types who gain by deviating as long as the Receiver reacts as if only such
types could be deviating. Generally, this vulnerability is not captured by
standard concepts in the re¯nements literature. While Credible Deviations
are eliminated on the class of monotonic signaling games (Section 3) by, for
example, Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 Criterion, this does not happen in a
related class of games (Section 4) where best response sets are not ordered
(see also the example in Section 1.1).
On the other hand we wish to emphasize the point that immunity from
Credible Deviations does not, by itself, serve well as a generally predictive
concept. In some games all equilibria may be Vulnerable to Credible De-
viations. This reinforces the fact that our primary goal is not to propose
an equilibrium re¯nement that selects a unique equilibrium in every game.
Instead it is to be aware of a type of non-robustness which some (or all) equi-
libria may possess in Sender-Receiver games that are used in applications.
The basis for our approach is centered on our view that the Receiver's
beliefs (and subsequent action) in response to a deviant message m should
be regarded as ambiguous to the Sender. While previous work has allowed
agents' beliefs to di®er o® the equilibrium path (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine
(1993)), ours is the ¯rst formalization (to our knowledge) which explicitly
allows ambiguity of the Receiver's beliefs from the Sender's perspective.
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6 Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote mh ´ M(µh). Since µh sends mh in equi-
librium, we have ^ a(µh;mh) = A(mh) (by de¯nition and uniqueness of ^ a()).













22implying ^ a(µ`;mh) ¸ ^ a(µh;mh) by monotonicity of uS.







for any µ and m. By the single-crossing condition, for any m,
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Recall that ^ a(µ`;mh) ¸ ^ a(µh;mh). If there exists m0 > mh such that
^ a(µ`;m0) · ^ a(µh;m0), then there is m00 2 [mh;m0] such that both ^ a(µ`;m00) =
^ a(µh;m00) and @^ a=@m(µ`;m00) · @^ a=@m(µh;m00), contradicting (7). ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. Let µ0 and m0 satisfy the inequalities in the lemma.
We show that the unique set of types to satisfy (1) is
C






The inequalities imply µ0 2 C0, and in fact that µ0 = minC0. By mono-
tonicity of uS() in a and by monotonicity of the Receiver's best response with
















Hence C0 satis¯es (1) with respect to m0 (showing existence).
To show that C0 is the unique such set, let C satisfy (1). For any µ < µ0,









where the last inequality follows from the lemma's assumption. Hence no
such type can belong to a deviators' club for m0. Hence minC ¸ µ0.
23If minC = µ > µ0, then again by monotonicity of the Receiver's best











But this contradicts the fact µ0 = 2 C. Hence µ0 = minC.
By (9), a credible deviators' club is uniquely determined by its minimum
element; no two distinct clubs can have the same minimum element. Hence
C = C0 de¯ned by (8). ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that some equilibrium mes-
sage me is sent by several types, the highest of which is µ0.
Note that A(me) < ¯(µ0;me) because µ0 is the highest of several types
that sends me (and due to the assumptions on uR). Therefore u¤
S(µ0) <
uS(µ0;me;¯(µ0;me)), i.e. µ0 would be better o® if the Receiver \knew" it was
µ0 sending me and best-responded accordingly.
We claim that there exists m00 > me such that u¤
S(µ0) =
uS(µ0;m00;¯(µ0;m00)) and uS(µ0;m00;¯(µ0;m00)) is locally decreasing in m. To
see this, it is enough to observe that uS tends to ¡1 as m ! 1, and ¯(µ0;m)
is bounded from above by assumption.
By choice of m00, ^ a(µ0;m00) = ¯(µ0;m00) < 1. By Lemma 1, for all µ < µ0
we have ^ a(µ;m00) > ^ a(µ0;m00), and hence u¤
S(µ) > uS(µ;m00;¯(µ0;m00)).
By continuity, there is an out of equilibrium message m0 < m00 (su±ciently
close to m00) such that u¤
S(µ0) < uS(µ0;m0;¯(µ0;m0)) and for all µ < µ0, u¤
S(µ) >
uS(µ;m0;¯(µ0;m0)). By Lemma 2, there exists a unique deviators' club with
respect to m0. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose an equilibrium (M;A;¹) is not Vulnerable
to Credible Deviations. By Lemma 3 it is separating: 1 · i 6= j · n
implies M(µi) 6= M(µj). If the Sender uses Riley messages (M(µi) ´ mr
i),
the Receiver responds accordingly, and we are done.
Otherwise, let µi be the lowest type such that M(µi) 6= mr








by incentive compatibility. Therefore M(µi) does not maximize
24uS(µi;m;¯(µi;m)) subject to the constraints of (5) (since the maximizer mr
i
is unique, by strict quasi-concavity in m). That is,
u
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By Lemma 2, there exists a unique deviators' club for message mr
i. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. To derive a contradiction under the hypothesis of the
lemma, let µj ¸ µs be the highest type for whom eqn. (6) fails; we prove
the lemma by showing that fµjg forms a unique credible deviators' club.
Throughout the proof, denote mi ´ M(µi) and ai ´ A(M(µi)).
(Existence) Incentive compatibility implies
d(µj¡1 ¡ aj¡1) ¡ d(µj¡1 ¡ aj) < c(µj¡1;mj) ¡ c(µj¡1;mj¡1) (10)
where the strictness follows from the choice of j. By assumption, either µj¡1
is a separating type, or pools only with lower types. Therefore the Receiver's
response to mj¡1 satis¯es aj¡1 · µj¡1¡b < µj¡b = aj. With our assumption
that the bias is not too small, this makes the left hand side of (10) positive.
The right hand side then implies mj > mj¡1.
For any ` < j ¡ 1, d(µ` ¡ aj¡1) ¡ d(µ` ¡ (µj ¡ b)) · d(µj¡1 ¡ aj¡1) ¡
d(µj¡1 ¡ (µj ¡ b)) by the convexity of d, while c(µj¡1;mj) ¡ c(µj¡1;mj¡1) <
c(µ`;mj) ¡ c(µ`;mj¡1) by the single-crossing property of c. Combining these
two inequalities with (10) we get d(µ` ¡aj¡1)¡d(µ` ¡(µj ¡b)) < c(µ`;mj)¡
c(µ`;mj¡1). The incentive constraint for µ` not to send mj¡1 is d(µ` ¡ a`) ¡
d(µ` ¡ aj¡1) · c(µ`;mj¡1) ¡ c(µ`;m`). Adding it to the previous inequality
yields
d(µ` ¡ a`) ¡ d(µ` ¡ (µj ¡ b)) < c(µ`;mj) ¡ c(µ`;m`) (11)
for all ` < j ¡ 1. With (10) this establishes that any µ` < µj strictly prefers
his equilibrium payo® to imitating type µj.
In the case that j < n, types µj and µj+1 both separate by assumption,
and µj is indi®erent between sending mj and mj+1:
d(µj ¡ (µj ¡ b)) ¡ d(µj ¡ (µj+1 ¡ b)) = c(µj;mj+1) ¡ c(µj;mj):
25Since µj+1 ¡ µj < 2b, the left hand side of the equality is positive.
By the convexity of d and the single-crossing property of c, for all h > j,
d(µh ¡(µj ¡b))¡d(µh ¡(µj+1 ¡b)) > c(µh;mj+1)¡c(µh;mj). The incentive
constraint for µh > µj+1 (if any exist) not to send mj+1 is d(µh¡(µj+1¡b))¡
d(b) ¸ c(µh;mh) ¡ c(µh;mj+1). Adding these two inequalities yields
d(µh ¡ (µj ¡ b)) ¡ d(b) > c(µh;mh) ¡ c(µh;mj):
Hence any µh > µj strictly prefers his equilibrium payo® to imitating type µj.
By continuity, this implies that C = fµjg satis¯es (1) for any message
mj ¡ ", as long as " > 0 is kept su±ciently small so as not to violate the
strict inequalities established above. Only type µj would gain from sending
mj ¡ " if the Receiver would react to it with the action a = µj ¡ b.
(Uniqueness) We complete the proof by showing that there is no other
deviators' club for message mj ¡ ", whenever " is su±ciently small.
For µ` < µj to belong to a deviators' club requires that he gain even when
the Receiver believes the message came from µ`, i.e. d(µ` ¡(µ` ¡b))¡d(µ` ¡
a`) < c(µ`;m`) ¡ c(µ`;mj ¡ "). Adding this to (11) yields
d(µ` ¡ (µ` ¡ b)) ¡ d(µ` ¡ (µj ¡ b)) < c(µ`;mj) ¡ c(µ`;mj ¡ "):
The left hand side of this inequality, which can be written d(b)¡d(b¡(µj¡µ`)),
is positive because 0 < µj ¡ µ` < 2b. Hence for su±ciently small " > 0, this
inequality is violated; µ` < µj cannot belong to any credible deviators' club
C for message mj ¡ ", when " > 0 is su±ciently small.
On the other hand, suppose some deviators' club for mj ¡ " consisted
only of types higher than µj. Similar reasoning as above implies that µj
would want to \join that club" since jµj ¡ (µh ¡ b)j < jµj ¡ (µj ¡ b)j when
µh < µj, i.e. µj is even better o® when the Receiver believes the message was
sent by µh than when the Sender believes it was µj. This contradicts the fact
that such a club C exists without µj.
Therefore, any such club C must contain µj. But we have already proven
that no other type gains by sending mj ¡ " when the Receiver chooses a =
µj ¡ b. We conclude that fµjg is the unique deviators' club for (any out-of-
equilibrium) message mj ¡" when " > 0 is chosen su±ciently small, making
26the equilibrium Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation. ¤
Proof of Lemma 6. Denote mi ´ M(µi) and ai ´ A(M(µi)).
Let ^ mp denote the message that would give µp his his equilibrium payo®
if the Receiver would respond with action a = µp ¡ b, i.e.
d(µp ¡ ap) ¡ d(µp ¡ (µp ¡ b)) = c(µp; ^ mp) ¡ c(µp;mp): (12)
We shall prove that fµpg is a unique deviators' club for some message ^ mp¡".
First, we show that for all i 6= p, if µi would send ^ mp and the Receiver
would respond with a = µp ¡b, then µi would be strictly worse o® than he is
in equilibrium, i.e.
d(µi ¡ ai) ¡ d(µi ¡ (µp ¡ b)) < c(µi; ^ mp) ¡ c(µi;mi): (13)
To prove this claim we separately address types lower and higher than µp.
(Low Types) Since µp is the highest pooling type, the Receiver's re-
sponse to his equilibrium message is ap < µp ¡ b. This implies that the left
hand side of eqn. (12) is positive, hence ^ mp > mp.
For all ` < p, d(µ`¡ap)¡d(µ`¡(µp¡b)) · d(µp¡ap)¡d(µp¡(µp¡b)) by the
convexity of d, and c(µp; ^ mp) ¡ c(µp;mp) < c(µ`; ^ mp) ¡ c(µ`;mp) by ^ mp > mp
and the single-crossing property of c. Combining these two inequalities with
eqn. (12) yields d(µ` ¡ ap) ¡ d(µ` ¡ (µp ¡ b)) < c(µ`; ^ mp) ¡ c(µ`;mp). The
incentive constraint for µ` not to imitate µp is ¡d(µ` ¡ ap) ¡ c(µ`;mp) ·
¡d(µ` ¡ a`) ¡ c(µ`;m`). Adding it to the previous inequality yields
d(µ` ¡ a`) ¡ d(µ` ¡ (µp ¡ b)) < c(µ`; ^ mp) ¡ c(µ`;m`) 8` < p
so (13) holds for all µi < µp.
(High Types) Lemma 5 says that µp+1 (if it exists) separates from µp at
the least cost, that is,
¡ d(µp ¡ (µp+1 ¡ b)) ¡ c(µp;mp+1) = ¡d(µp ¡ ap) ¡ c(µp;mp): (14)
Since jµp ¡ (µp+1 ¡ b)j < jµp ¡ (µp ¡ b)j, this equality with eqn. (12) implies
27^ mp < mp+1. Combine eqns. (12) and (14) to get
d(µp ¡ (µp ¡ b)) ¡ d(µp ¡ (µp+1 ¡ b)) = c(µp;mp+1) ¡ c(µp; ^ mp):
For h > p, d(µh¡(µp¡b))¡d(µh¡(µp+1¡b)) ¸ d(µp¡(µp¡b))¡d(µp¡(µp+1¡b))
by the convexity of d, while c(µp;mp+1)¡c(µp; ^ mp) > c(µh;mp+1)¡c(µh; ^ mp)
by mp+1 > ^ mp and the single-crossing property of c. Therefore, for h > p,
¡d(µh ¡ (µp+1 ¡ b)) ¡ c(µh;mp+1) > ¡d(µh ¡ (µp ¡ b)) ¡ c(µh; ^ mp). The
incentive constraint for µh not to imitate type µp+1 is ¡d(b) ¡ c(µh;mh) ¸
¡d(µh ¡ (µp+1 ¡ b)) ¡ c(µh;mp+1). With the previous inequality, for h > p,
¡d(b) ¡ c(µh;mh) > ¡d(µh ¡ (µp ¡ b)) ¡ c(µh; ^ mp):
This establishes (13) for all µi > µp.
We ¯nish the proof by arguing that for any su±ciently small ", fµpg is
the unique credible deviators' club with respect to message ^ mp ¡ ". Since
these arguments are mostly the same as those used in the end of the proof
of Lemma 5, we keep these arguments brief.
Continuity in eqn. (13) implies that for su±ciently small ", C = fµpg
satis¯es (1) with respect to message ^ mp¡". To show that no other deviators'
club C can exist, ¯rst consider µ` < µp. Since 0 < µp ¡ µ` < 2b, any such
µ` would prefer the Receiver to take action µp ¡ b rather than µ` ¡ b. Hence
by transitivity and (13), µ` cannot belong to a deviators' club for message
^ mp ¡ ", as in the proof of Lemma 5.
Finally, if a deviators' club consisted only of higher types µh, µp would
want to join that club, which is a contradiction. Hence µp belongs to any such
C, in which case (13) implies µh could not belong to the club for message
^ mp¡", preferring his equilibrium payo® to the one he gets when the Receiver
responds with action a = µp ¡ b. ¤
28